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1. Constitution making is by no means the only significant method of peace building
after conflict. For two incisive broader treatments, see  ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, CONFLICT
AND PEACE BUILDING IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES (2007); JANE STROMSETH, DAVID WIPPMAN &
ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY
INTERVENTIONS (2006).
2. For the essentials of the debate, see AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL
SOCIETIES (1977) (presenting the consociational view); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS
IN CONFLICT 566-76 (2000) [hereinafter ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT] (criticizing the
consociational view); Donald L. Horowitz, Making Moderation Pay: The Comparative Politics
of Ethnic Conflict Management, in CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES
451 (Joseph V. Montville ed., 1991) [hereinafter Making Moderation Pay] (articulating the
incentives view).
3. Some partial exceptions are certain regimes formed after warfare. See infra text
accompanying notes 27-29, 35-49, 102-05.
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CONCILIATORY INSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESSES IN POST-CONFLICT STATES
DONALD L. HOROWITZ*
There are two important questions in post-conflict constitution
making, and at present neither of them has a definitive or uni-
formly accepted answer.1 The first relates to the best configuration
of institutions to adopt in order to ameliorate the problem of
intergroup conflict. The second concerns the process most apt to
produce the best configuration of institutions, whatever it might be.
The first question is unanswered because there is a dispute among
scholars and practitioners between two opposing views of appropri-
ate institutions to mitigate conflict.2 Constitutional processes have
not generally been geared to yield coherent exemplars of either
configuration in a sufficient number of conflict-prone countries3 to
provide a convincing demonstration of the superiority of one
approach or the other. The second question is unanswered because
in many cases constitutional processes are chosen in a haphazard
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4. See infra text accompanying note 78.
fashion, without regard to the aptness of the process for the
problems to be addressed. Meanwhile, advocates have been arguing
for a single, highly structured, uniform process that may be apt for
some classes of problems but is not necessarily appropriate for the
full range of problems constitution makers confront in coping with
divided societies.4 Hence the questions of what and how are both
subject to debate.
This Article takes up both questions. It surveys the main
contending prescriptions for constitutional designs to cope with
serious ethnic conflict, and it enumerates some of the main
objections to each. It then reviews some of the available evidence on
the efficacy of the contending prescriptions before turning to the
question of adoptability. The Article notes that there are many
obstacles to the adoption of a coherent set of political institutions to
mitigate conflict, which derive mainly from processes of constitution
making. For this reason, the Article evaluates some of the main
suggestions in the recent literature on constitutional process and
thereafter devotes considerable attention to the difficult question of
designing a process for constitution making that is geared to the
specific problems faced by constitutional designers.
I. INSTITUTIONS: THE DEBATE
Suppose a society contains two ascriptive (birth-derived) groups:
the As, with 60 percent of the population, and the Bs, with 40
percent. The groups have the same age structures and rates of
natural increase; their proportions are not vulnerable to change
through immigration; they vote at the same rates; and they vote
exclusively for ascriptively defined political parties, the A party and
the B party. Under virtually every form of fair majoritarian political
arrangement and every electoral system, the As will dominate
government and the Bs will be in opposition in perpetuity. Of
course, no society approximates all of these conditions, but many
resemble this situation, with ascriptive cleavages (hereafter called
ethnic cleavages) based on race, color and appearance, language,
religion, regional origin, or some other criterion of group difference.
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5. See generally ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT, supra note 2.
6. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY 114-21 (1971); Barry Holden, Liberal
Democracy and the Social Determination of Ideas, in NOMOS XXV: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 289,
307-09 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983).
In many societies, there are ethnically based parties, ethnic voting
at very high rates, and electoral outcomes that foster a sense of
group inclusion and exclusion that exacerbates whatever preexist-
ing conflicts are present between the groups. Not surprisingly, a
great many violent conflicts follow electoral exclusion of this kind,
whether anticipated or accomplished.5
In some cases, conflicts are not bipolar, as the A-B conflict is, but
tripolar or multipolar. Even where the conflict is bipolar, as it is for
the most part in, for example, Northern Ireland, Fiji, Cyprus,
Rwanda, and Burundi, there are subgroup differences—that is,
within the A and B groups—that mitigate the overall polarization.
Whatever the complexity of intergroup and intragroup relations in
such societies, however, polarization and exclusion can follow from
ascriptive differences, compounded by the history, advantages and
disadvantages, and divergent views of the identity of the state that
are all associated with these differences.
There are three principal ways to think about avoiding exclusion
and polarization in such a society. One way, which comes naturally
to Anglo-American democrats, is to think of majority rule with
strong minority rights. But it is instantly obvious that for the 60-40
A-B problem—and, in considerable measure, for all of its more
complex and more common variants—the prospect of perennial
exclusion from governmental power makes this an unsatisfying
course, both practically and theoretically. It is practically unsatisfy-
ing because without a minority share of power, or at least the
threat of a share of power, minority rights are likely to wither. It is
theoretically unsatisfying because democratic theory sees electoral
politics as a matter of choice, rather than birth, and does not
conceive ascriptive majority rule to be what is meant by majority
rule at all.6 When elections are wholly governed by birth, the term
election is scarcely appropriate. That leaves two other possibilities
contemplated by the literature on divided societies.
The first, which goes by the name consociational democracy,
seeks to elide the problem of majority rule altogether by requiring
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7. See LIJPHART, supra note 2; Hans Daalder, The Consociational Democracy Theme, 26
WORLD POL. 604 (1974).
8. LIJPHART, supra note 2, at 25-47.
9. Consociationalists prefer parliamentary to presidential regimes but do not
automatically rule out presidentialism if other consociational requirements are met. See, e.g.,
id. at 33.
10. See Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in THE
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY 15, 23-25 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002) [hereinafter
the inclusion of all groups in government.7 The consociational
approach is essentially a regime of guarantees. It postulates that all
major groups will be represented in governing grand coalitions in
proportion to their numbers, as determined by election results; that,
to facilitate proportional inclusion in cabinets, elections will be
conducted by a proportional electoral system; that major decisions
will be made in cabinet by consensus; that financial allocations and
civil service representation will be proportional to group member-
ship; and that matters of concern to only one group will be left to
that group to deal with autonomously.8 So, the underlying princi-
ples are proportional inclusion, mutual group vetoes on major
issues, and group cultural autonomy.
The grand coalition implies that the model of government and
opposition is rejected. Consensual democracy replaces majoritarian
democracy, and opposition is necessarily located inside government.
Group vetoes on ethnically divisive issues mean that much
government action is precluded or accomplished only when veto
players can be compensated. The policy process becomes complex.
Moreover, the inclusive assumptions of the model prefer, if they do
not foreclose, certain constitutional design decisions; for example,
cabinet government is necessarily parliamentary rather than
presidential.9 Inclusion also means that cabinets are not formed on
the basis of ideological affinity. The assumption, almost always
correct, is that parties in severely divided societies are based on
ethnic identification, and ethnic extremists are to be represented
proportionately along with moderates.
It is precisely on this last point that a competing model diverges.
This model suggests that, in a severely divided society, it is
paramount to encourage compromise and accommodation, which
moderates are more likely to achieve than are those with completely
opposite programs.10 The alternative approach aims, therefore, to
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Constitutional Design]; see also Making Moderation Pay, supra note 2; Ben Reilly,
Preferential Voting and Political Engineering: A Comparative Study, 35 J. COMMONWEALTH
& COMP. POL. 1 (1997).
11. See, e.g., TIMOTHY D. SISK, POWER SHARING AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN
ETHNIC CONFLICTS 41 (1996). Sisk also refers to this approach as “integrative,” a less apt
description, because the approach aims at a modicum of cooperative political behavior but
not at anything like the dissolution of group boundaries or the creation of bonds of
friendship.
12. See BENJAMIN REILLY, DEMOCRACY IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES: ELECTORAL ENGINEERING
FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 18-19 (2001).
13. See ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 635-38.
14. See id. at 633-35.
support moderates against extremists. This approach does not
abandon majoritarian democracy, but it aims at majorities that are
cross-ethnic and at governments formed by moderate interethnic
coalitions.
Because it seeks to support the moderate middle, this perspective
is frequently referred to as the centripetal approach; its principal
tool is not a regime of ethnic guarantees but the provision of
incentives, usually electoral incentives, that accord an advantage
to ethnically based parties that are willing to appeal, at the margin
and usually through coalition partners of other ethnic groups, to
voters other than their own.11 The underlying mechanism is that,
to appeal to voters other than one’s own and to form interethnic
coalitions in a conflict-prone society, ethnically based parties must
demonstrate that they are moderate and willing to compromise on
ethnic issues. The particular electoral systems employed to
encourage moderation vary with the circumstances. In some cases,
the alternative vote, a preferential system that facilitates the
interethnic exchange of second and subsequent preferences, has
been used.12 In other cases, where territory is a proxy for ethnicity,
territorial distribution of the vote, in addition to a plurality of votes,
has been required for electoral victory.13 This is particularly helpful
in presidential elections, in order to induce candidates to become
pan-ethnic in their orientation. In other cases, multimember
constituencies with ethnically reserved seats but common-roll
elections, have facilitated the emergence of mixed tickets of ethnic
moderates.14 The centripetal approach does not generally favor list-
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15. See SISK, supra note 11, at 38-39.
16. Id. at 37, 42.
17. See Donald L. Horowitz, The Many Uses of Federalism, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 953, 960-61
(2007).
18. Id. at 960.
19. Id. at 961-62.
20. ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT, supra note 2, at 603.
21. Id. at 604.
22. See id. at 602-13.
system proportional representation, which it sees as producing
results that reflect, or even exacerbate, existing ethnic cleavages.15
Besides electoral incentives for moderation, the centripetal
approach has a number of other tools it employs. Like con-
sociationalists, centripetalists favor federalism in multiethnic
countries, but for different reasons.16 Consociationalists see
federalism as a device to foster group autonomy in homogeneous
regions or provinces. Centripetalists prefer it as a way to blunt the
effect of stark opposition among solidary ethnic groups at the center
by allowing subethnic differences, which might otherwise be latent,
to emerge within homogeneous units of a federation, where
federalism encourages subgroup competition for power in those
units.17 In heterogeneous provinces, on the other hand, federalism
can foster intergroup cooperation between politicians as a form of
political socialization to norms of cooperation before they arrive at
the center.18 Federalism can also serve as a form of electoral reform,
as proliferation of federal units changes electoral boundaries
and has an impact on the number of political parties and their
relative strength nationwide.19 So, for example, in the Nigerian
First Republic (1960-66), the Hausa-Fulani, representing about 30
percent of the total population but a majority in the undivided
Northern Region, were able to control that region sufficiently to use
it as a springboard to gain electoral power at the center.20 Later,
when regions were carved into much larger numbers of states, the
power of the Hausa-Fulani was confined to six of the ten states into
which the Northern Region was divided.21 The result was a decline
in their effective electoral power and the creation of great incentives
for them to cooperate with other ethnic groups in order to gain a
share of power at the center.22 In these ways, federalism can have
a profound effect on ethnic conflict at the national level.
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23. Id. at 646-48.
24. SISK, supra note 11, at 44-45.
25. Id.
26. Constitutional Design, supra note 10, at 20; see also Ian S. Spears, Understanding
The aims of centripetalists are always directed at moderation,
but the means they advocate are not always the same. For instance,
on the well-supported assumption that multipolar ethnic conflict is
more fluid and generally less dangerous than bipolar conflict,
centripetalists try to preserve multipolar fluidity where it exists,
rather than allow it to degenerate into bifurcation; they may also
look favorably on the use of subgroup cleavages to foster alliances
between portions of one group and portions of another.23 For such
purposes, both electoral and territorial engineering may provide
incentives.
Neither the consociational nor the centripetal approach has
abolition of ethnic conflict as its agenda. Both accept the existence
of ethnic cleavages and attempt to manage their effects—in one
case, by guaranteed representation and outcomes and in the other,
by various regimes of incentives to moderation, cooperation, or
fragmentation. The consociational approach has a well-specified
menu of institutions, whereas the centripetal approach is at
home with a variety of governmental institutions, presidential or
parliamentary, provided that appropriate incentives are built in.
So far as parties and elections go, consociationalists aspire to a
post-electoral compromise—hence the grand coalition—whereas
centripetalists aspire to a pre-electoral compromise—hence various
incentives to induce parties to pool votes and form coalitions across
group lines.24 According to the latter, pre-election compromise is
superior, because it requires that parties make commitments to
moderate their ethnic claims in order to secure alliances and
electoral support across group lines, whereas compulsory post-
election coalitions require no such commitments.25
Both approaches have been subject to considerable criticism.
Consociationalism has been called motivationally challenged,
because it assumes that a majority ethnic group, where one exists,
will be willing to exchange the complete power it could gain through
the polls for a frustrating system of power sharing, including
minority vetoes.26 When majorities are weak, however, or when they
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Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power, 21 THIRD WORLD Q.
105, 110 (2000).
27. See generally NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE DIVIDED WORLD (John McGarry ed., 2001).
28. See STANLEY KYRIAKIDES, CYPRUS: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CRISIS GOVERNMENT 53-
71 (1968).
29. See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, TO END A WAR (1998). In the Bosnian case, the largest
group, Bosniaks, comprised a large plurality, not a majority.
30. Donald L. Horowitz, Self-Determination: Politics, Philosophy, and Law, in NOMOS
XXXI: ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 421, 439  & 457 n.31 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds.,
1997) [hereinafter Self-Determination] (reviewing the evidence).
31. Id. at 439-40.
32. See ELS WITTE ET AL., POLITICAL HISTORY OF BELGIUM FROM 1830 ONWARDS (Raf
Casert trans., 2000).
forecast future weakness, they have sometimes been willing to
accept a consociational formula, as they did in Northern Ireland in
1998,27 Cyprus in 1960,28 and Bosnia in 1995.29 Civil wars, there-
fore, can sometimes be brought to an end with consociational
arrangements, but the desirability and durability of such agree-
ments are often in doubt.
To the extent that the motive for this exchange of monopoly
power for shared power is assumed to be statesmanship, the
inarticulate presupposition is that political leaders in severely
divided societies are less ethnocentric than their followers and
therefore willing to forego zero-sum outcomes for cooperative
schemes. On this, the evidence is mixed at best. In some countries,
leaders are more tolerant than followers; in others, they are equally
or less tolerant.30
Furthermore, the willingness of leaders to form interethnic
coalitions can produce a negative reaction among members of their
own groups, which in turn can lead to the formation of new,
ethnically exclusive parties on the flanks.31 If so, what begins as a
grand coalition may end as a coalition of the middle, opposed by
extremists on the flanks who are able to thwart interethnic
compromise by making inroads into the support of those who join
such coalitions. In short, the grand coalition may not be durable. As
an empirical matter, completely inclusive coalitions are rare in
democratic countries, even those utilizing some consociational
devices, such as Belgium.32
Other elements of the consociational dispensation are vulnerable
as well. A longstanding literature attacks proportional represen-
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33. See Guy Lardeyret, The Problem with PR, in THE GLOBAL RESURGENCE OF
DEMOCRACY 175 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2d ed. 1996); Giovanni Sartori,
European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism, in POLITICAL PARTIES AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 137 (Joseph LaPalombara & Myron Weiner eds., 1966).
34. KYRIACOS C. MARKIDES, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC 27-28 (1977).
35. Id. at 28-30, 155-57.
36. See Florian Bieber, After Dayton, Dayton? The Evolution of an Unpopular Peace, 5
ETHNOPOL. 15 (2006).
37. See Joanne Hughes & Caitlin Donnelly, Community Relations in Northern Ireland:
A Shift in Attitudes?, 29 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 643 (2003).
38. See id.
39. See Kris Deschouwer, The Unintended Consequences of Consociational Federalism:
The Case of Belgium, in POWER SHARING: NEW CHALLENGES FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES 92 (Ian
O’Flynn & David Russell eds., 2005); Liesbet Hooghe, Belgium: Hollowing the Center, in
FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL CLEAVAGES 55 (Ugo M. Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds., 2004).
tation as a polarizing system that increases the distance between
voting blocs in societies that already possess some degree of
polarized identities.33 Group vetoes can produce a great deal of
policy immobilism. The frequent use of such vetoes by the Turkish
minority on Cyprus led the Greek majority to terminate the
consociational arrangement of 1960 within three years.34 Cyprus
lapsed into civil strife and eventually a Turkish invasion and
partition.35 Bosnia’s consociational constitution, embodied in the
Dayton Accords of 1995, has allowed ethnic leaders to prevent
policy innovation for more than a decade.36 In Northern Ireland, the
consociational formula produced by the Good Friday Agreement has
resulted in periodic breakdown of governing arrangements, a
considerable decline in interethnic moderation as measured in
surveys, and the growth of extremist parties at the expense of the
moderate middle.37 During periods in which government has been
functioning in Northern Ireland, consociational norms have
operated to convert the smallest distributive issues—for example,
where to site a hospital or a nursery—into complex issues of ethnic
policy requiring cumbersome exchanges to resolve.38
In severely divided societies, the recent record of consociational
constitutions is, at best, debatable. In Europe, the Belgian regime
is fragile, its governing center increasingly hollowed out by efforts
to devolve more autonomous powers to its ethnically differentiated
regions, in which ethnic outbidding proceeds with little restraint.39
Bosnia has made little serious progress in conflict amelioration or
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40. See Carrie Manning, Elections and Political Change in Post-war Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 11 DEMOCRATIZATION 60, 82 (2004).
41. See Hughes & Donnelly, supra note 37; see also supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
42. Steven Ian Wilkinson, India, Consociational Theory, and Ethnic Violence, 40 ASIAN
SURV. 767 (2000).
43. See René Lemarchand, Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda,
Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 106 AFR. AFF. 1 (2007).
44. See generally HEATHER DEEGAN, SOUTH AFRICA REBORN: BUILDING A NEW
DEMOCRACY (1999).
45. See id. at 7 & n.13.
46. Id. at 9, 12 n.27.
47. See Daniel P. Sullivan, The Missing Pillars: A Look at the Failure of Peace in Burundi
Through the Lens of Arend Lijphart’s Theory of Consociational Democracy, 43 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 75 (2005).
48. See Comprehensive Peace Agreement, The Implementation Modalities of the Protocol
on Power Sharing, dated 26th May, 2004 (Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://www.usip.org/
library/pa/sudan/cpa01092005/implementation_agreement.pdf.
49. Glenn Kessler, Sudan’s Peace Deal, Seen as a Bush Success, Is Endangered, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 2007, at A18.
in reduction in the influence of extremists,40 and in Northern
Ireland, as mentioned, moderates have lost support and extremist
parties have flourished.41 The most that can be said is that, with a
few exceptions, violence has been contained. Even here, however, a
serious issue arises. A careful study discloses that the presence of
consociational features in India’s governing arrangements at
various times tends to coincide with higher levels of ethnic violence
than prevail in other periods when consociational features are
absent.42 Africa has experimented with peace agreements contain-
ing such consociational features.43 South Africa’s transition was
facilitated by a few temporary guarantees.44 Burundi has twice
made serious attempts at consociational regimes.45 The first
attempt in 1992 was quickly aborted by a coup, and the 2000
arrangement foundered on a wave of indiscriminate arrests in late
2006.46 It could be said that Burundi’s agreements omitted some
consociational elements,47 but Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace
Agreement of 2005 did not: it contained a grand coalition, a limited
minority veto, proportionality in the cabinet, and extensive
autonomy for the South.48 It has not collapsed; it simply has not
begun to operate, and there are serious doubts that it will.49
In some cases, as indicated, there has not been a fair test,
because a few consociational features were imported into the
agreement, while others were missing. In other cases, however, the
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agreements were made with the overriding purpose of producing
peace between governments and armed rebels or among a variety
of armed factions. Consociationalism then amounts to a “warlords’
peace,”50 which is volatile because the various armed forces cannot
be integrated into a single force, or because the arrangement is
merely tactical, or because the presence of arms makes leaders
willing to act quickly at the first signs of breach. The irony is that
warfare may be hard to end except on at least some consociational
terms, but without the presence of strong external forces, as in
Bosnia, the durability of such agreements is in doubt. Reviewing
the failure of Angola’s power-sharing agreement in 1998, when the
two sides returned to warfare, each thinking it could win total
power, Ian S. Spears remarked: “[T]here are few incentives to
forming inclusive governments when risk-acceptant groups have
the option of complete political power and believe the attainment of
that option is very likely.”51
The centripetal approach has also given rise to lively debates.52
Some of its electoral mechanisms might allow majorities to gain
power, in part on the marginal votes of minorities, but without the
necessary participation of those minorities in government.53 In
cases where those electoral systems have been used, the benign or
malign results have been subject to contest.54 As with the
consociational cases, there has sometimes been deterioration of
interethnic harmony, or the durability of accommodative institu-
tions, or the quality of democracy. Such consequences have been
produced in some countries that utilize electoral systems designed
to encourage interethnic vote pooling and in others that had vote
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pooling and interethnic coalitions without deliberate electoral
engineering.55
In spite of such difficulties, there is an increasing tendency to
think of moderating conflict behavior as entailing a search for
institutions that will produce incentives to interethnic conciliation
and, specifically, institutions that utilize the mechanism of inducing
or requiring marginal dependence for electoral success on the
support of voters other than one’s own.56 Such measures can
produce accommodative  tendencies. Consider a few illustrations.
In 1978, Nigeria adopted an electoral system that required that
the winning candidate secure not only a plurality of votes cast in
presidential elections, but also at least 25 percent of the votes cast
in no fewer than two-thirds of the states.57 In tandem with changes
in Nigeria’s federal arrangements discussed earlier, the result was
to produce presidents with panethnic outlooks and to change the
party system by making it difficult for purely ethnically based
parties to compete.58 Seeking similar effects, Indonesia adopted a
presidential vote-distribution formula in 2002.59
In Papua New Guinea, the alternative vote, with its majority
threshold for victory, effectively required candidates to secure
support from multiple groups in their constituencies.60 AV, an
electoral system utilized for nearly a century in Australia, has a
long record of producing centripetal outcomes.61 When AV was
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dropped in Papua New Guinea in favor of first-past-the-post
elections, candidates won on small pluralities, consisting of their
kinsmen alone, and violent intergroup conflict increased greatly.62
Responding to this conflict, Papua New Guinea has recently
returned to AV.63
Finally, a careful quantitative study of India has shown that anti-
Muslim violence is significantly less frequent and severe in those
Indian states in which the ruling party is at least partly dependent
on Muslim electoral support than it is in states in which the
support of Muslim voters is unnecessary.64 Fearful of losing that
support, ruling parties dependent on Muslim votes control their
Hindu supporters and repress violence if it occurs. Not surprisingly,
parties respond, at least on matters of life and death, to those who
vote for them.
Electoral innovations, however, are not always easy to arrange.
AV, for example, requires ethnically heterogeneous constituencies,
which may not exist or may later be gerrymandered out of exis-
tence. Although Nigeria’s territorial distribution system is used
in presidential elections, many countries prefer parliamentary
systems. Most important, perhaps, is a failing that can be illus-
trated by an example from Nigeria. When the Nigerians adopted
their presidential electoral formula in 1978, they did not adopt a
comparable conciliatory electoral formula to encourage interethnic
vote pooling in their legislative constituencies, which in any case
were mainly homogeneous.65 Legislators, largely elected on votes of
members of their own groups, do not have incentives comparable to
those of presidential candidates to behave in ways conducive to
interethnic moderation. Consequently, Nigeria is a case in which
conciliatory electoral engineering was limited to a single office.
Constitution makers often fail to adopt coherent designs of
either the consociational or the centripetal type—that is, regimes
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of consistent, interlocking, mutually reinforcing institutions that
adhere to a single approach to reducing conflict. Because ethnic
conflict can be a powerful force, it often requires a full suite of
political institutions to counter it. The mixed results that are
observable when states adopt one or two consociational features, or
one or two incentives to interethnic moderation, may be attributed
to the existence of other institutions that do nothing to reduce
ethnic conflict and sometimes actively counteract the benign effects
of conciliatory devices. Yet partial adoptions are the rule, and
coherent packages are the exception.
Suppose, for example, that proportional representation is
adopted, and parties of various ethnic groups are represented
proportionately in the legislature and in the cabinet, as
consociational theory specifies, but the minority group veto is not
adopted, so the regime is majoritarian. There would then be the
prospect of ethnic-minority exclusion abetted by an electoral system
that perfected that exclusion and made the results even more
predictable. On the other side, how should a regime be judged if it
adopts an electoral system that provides incentives for interethnic
accommodation but also provides some consociational guarantees
that mitigate the rule of interethnic moderates by guaranteeing
extremists a place in the cabinet?66 Such partial innovations and
hybrid outcomes may well be at the root of the inability to form
conclusive judgments about contending prescriptions for interethnic
accommodation. If so, constitutional processes and their impact on
the adoptability of contending designs are the neglected elements
in debates about measures to promote interethnic accommodation.
II. ADOPTABILITY: THE QUESTION OF PROCESS
It is more common to find one or two consociational practices
than the full ensemble of consociational institutions. The same is
true of incentives to moderation, which may be adopted only
partially. The process of designing institutions—specifically, the
process of making constitutions—is much more conducive to partial
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or even conflicting innovations than it is to the adoption of coherent
designs whose elements reinforce each other. There are many
reasons for this shortfall.
Constitutions are made in times of crisis, when existing arrange-
ments have been shown to be illegitimate or ineffective, or both.
Many are made after periods of warfare, during fragile ceasefires,
when time is of the essence. Very commonly, there are explicit
deadlines for producing the constitutional document.67 Deliberation
may then take a back seat to reaching an agreement, any agree-
ment. Pressure is likely to grow to get the drafting done, even if
imperfectly.
Moreover, constitution making is a loosely structured task. The
nature of the job can seem vague and unspecified. Constitutions are
made by people who have not made a constitution before and will
not be likely to make a constitution again. There is, therefore, a
great deal of lost knowledge from one constitution-making process
to another and a good deal of fumbling along the way. Although
many constitutions appear to be the result of deliberations, most
are actually the product of a variety of accidents, biases, con-
straints, fears, and inhibitions, not to mention (yet) the role of
negotiations between actors with conflicting preferences.
To begin with, there is the part played by limited comparative
vision, or what may be called model bias.68 The most pertinent
constitutional examples are usually from countries that have faced
similar problems and displayed some success in dealing with them,
but those countries may be on the other side of the world and
outside the field of vision of current constitution makers. Instead,
constitution drafters may seek to emulate the constitution of one or
more of the most democratic and successful countries or of the ex-
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colonial power (if there is one), or of other countries in their region
or cultural zone, or of the most influential foreign advisor on the
scene, who may be a captive of home-country bias, a preference for
the institutions already familiar to himself or herself.
There are also problems of historical bias. In some countries, the
objective is to design a constitution that avoids problems that the
state experienced in the past. Alternatively, constitutional design-
ers may constrict their vision, because they misperceive what
designs have been attempted in their country in the past, and with
what effects. In either case, history operates as a considerable
constraint. It is not amiss to say that many constitutions are
documents made for the future by people focused on the past,
documents made for a long time horizon by people with short time
horizons.
So, too, does preexisting institutional capacity constrain consti-
tutional decisions. When Germany and Italy unified in the nine-
teenth century, both had very strong regional traditions that might
have led to federal constitutions.69 Yet only Germany became a
federation. Unlike Germany, Italy had no preexisting regional
legislatures or administrations to which to devolve power.70 Low
institutional capacity can be a major constraint on creating a
federal system, even where a federal system might otherwise be
expected to emerge.
Then there are constraints that derive from the process of
constitution making itself. The actors at the table may possess
asymmetric preferences. Whereas majorities typically want un-
impeded majority rule, minorities are very likely to want guaran-
tees and, therefore, may be attracted by consociational plans. In
addition, particular political parties are likely to have a sense of the
institutions which, if adopted, will favor them and disfavor their
opponents. They have what might be called visibility with respect
to their interests. They may, of course, prove to be wrong about
what decisions will benefit them, but, right or wrong, the positions
they take are strongly affected by what they see as being in their
interest. Generally, drafters do not have the luxury of making a
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constitution behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance71 that the
American framers had. By 1787, a party system had not yet
crystallized, allowing the framers to go about their business without
close regard for partisan interest.72 In most contemporary states,
visibility of group interests and party interests is a major impedi-
ment to constitutional planning. 
In ethnically divided societies, there is a special, and especially
pernicious, version of this problem. Politicians who benefit from
hostile sentiment toward other groups and its concrete results in
the political system are unlikely to transform the conflict-prone
environment that supports their political careers. As a result,
severely divided societies, which may be most in need of institutions
to reduce conflict, may be least likely to adopt them.
Even those participants who are not aiming to nurture particular
interests may think that institutional choices should not necessarily
depend on the propensity of specific institutions to reduce the
incidence of ethnic conflict. The participants may have other goals,
such as adopting an electoral system that promotes proportionality
of seats to votes as a desirable end in itself, or a system that fosters
accountability of representatives to constituents, or one that
reduces the number of parties.73 All of these are legitimate goals of
electoral-system choice, but none is identical to—and some are in
conflict with—choosing a system intended to promote interethnic
conciliation. The same goes for other institutional choices, which
may be made on grounds completely apart from their propensity
to mitigate or exacerbate intergroup conflict. The multiplicity of
participants gives rise to multiple goals in constitution making,
often at the expense of engineering structures to foster interethnic
accommodation.
Third parties on the scene may have yet a different agenda.
Especially if the conflict might turn back to violence, many third
parties will put reaching a quick constitutional settlement above all
other goals. Third parties often secure rewards from pressing the
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parties to a conflict to reach agreement—any agreement, so long as
it does not fall apart. Third parties do not need to live with the
settlement, and so they do not necessarily seek an optimal set of
institutions to control the conflict.
All of these forces favor a heavily negotiated outcome, often
involving an exchange of incommensurables rather than a coherent
plan for conflict reduction. The conditions that inhere in a great
many constitutional processes, therefore, are conducive to the
exchange of a little of this for a little of that—possibly a few group
guarantees, a great deal of majority rule, and relatively few, if any,
institutional incentives for interethnic moderation. Constitution
making is not typically as much a deliberative process as it is a
negotiating process. Many constitutions in severely divided societies
are not the product of single-minded attention to the goal of
reducing conflict. Many, in fact, do not contain any of the institu-
tions recommended by either of the contending consociational or
centripetal schools of thought.
The Iraq Constitution of 2005 is a case in point. It was made by
a process that excluded Sunni representatives and that produced a
carve-up between Shia and Kurdish negotiators.74 Apart from
enshrining values of federalism—and even then a Nigerian First
Republic-type federalism, with the prospect of a few large regions
leveraging their power to control the state75—and a few ethnically
reserved political offices, it is difficult to identify in that document
any institutions designed to reduce ethnic or sectarian conflict.76 In
this, the Iraq Constitution is not particularly atypical.
The first choice to be made by constitution makers is itself the
choice to choose—that is, the choice to consider constitutional
models specifically designed to reduce conflict. Unfortunately, many
constitutional processes do not reach this first step, but skip over
it, because participants may not be aware of the full range of
available institutions or the connections between institutional
choice and prospects for interethnic conciliation, or, as mentioned
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earlier, because they may be focused on other goals or interests.77
The precise configuration of the inchoate constitutional ideas that
constitution makers bring to their task is unmapped. It is quite
clear, however, despite the considerable internationalization of
constitutional design processes since 1989, that in most countries
there are great obstacles to constitutional engineering for inter-
ethnic conciliation at the threshold of the process. And if that is so,
it follows, a fortiori, that inducing constitution makers to produce
coherent ensembles of conflict-reducing institutions, either of the
consociational or the incentive-based sort, is a formidable task.
Many constitutions have been constructed, but few have been
designed.
III. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR PROCESS AND LIKELY OUTCOMES
The matter is made more difficult by the emergence of a new
literature on constitution drafting, which elevates process over the
substantive content of a constitution and aims to prescribe a
uniform series of norms for constitution making.78 Some of these
norms can prove to be dysfunctional for constitution making in
severely divided societies. In any case, the uniform character of the
prescription fails to take account of the variety of processes that
may be appropriate for specific problems faced by constitution
makers.
The admonitions about the right process are easy to recite. They
emphasize the virtues of public participation and transparency in
constitution making. A democratic constitutional process is said to
be necessary to the legitimacy of the final product, and a democratic
process means considerable public involvement at various stages
of the process. Civic education and efforts to engage the citizenry in
the constitutional process are considered to be preconditions for
citizen participation and dialogue. Hence there is a need for
extensive publicity and conversation with the public. New constitu-
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tions should be “deeply participatory at all stages of the process.”79
Broad ownership of the document is seen as a transcendent value.
It goes without saying that constitution makers who are indiffer-
ent to public opinion or who operate with little or no disclosure of
their ongoing work jeopardize the legitimacy of what they produce.
But to make participation and transparency the touchstones of the
legitimacy of a constitution is to exaggerate the benefits and
underestimate the costs of such a course. A single process model is
unlikely to be apt for all situations, and over the long run the
content of the institutions embodied in a constitution is likely to be
more important for the democratic future of a state than is the
presence of the highest levels of public participation and openness
in the way in which the constitution is created.
There is no special reason why constitution making should be
exempt from the embrace of representative government, and there
are many reasons why representation, rather than direct democ-
racy, should have a privileged place in constitution making.
Constitutions are a complex matter. Most people have little or no
incentive to acquire the requisite information to deal with the
details of constitutional design. On the contrary, constitutional
design is one of those matters on which most rational people will
have good reason not to acquire information, as the literature on
rational ignorance would suggest.80
There is also a significant tradeoff between participation and
transparency, on the one hand, and expertise, on the other. As the
first Part of this Article suggested, some constitutional goals are
much more likely to be achieved if experts are deployed to think
clearly, bring pertinent comparative experience to bear, and draft
carefully. These are tasks with which constitution makers often
have difficulty—recall the array of constraints and biases enumer-
ated earlier81—and they are not tasks best performed in the light of
day, with very large numbers of participants. Public consultation at
several points in the process is certainly necessary, but large parts
of the process need to be entrusted to representatives and experts.
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To these propositions there is a major exception. Transparency
is especially important and public consultations need to be more
frequent when there is pronounced distrust of the regime that is
involved in the constitutional process. When the old regime has
departed, however, or when it has been subdued or made account-
able through democratic elections and distrust has subsided, the
need to be conspicuously open at every step is much reduced.
A different prescription for constitutional process has been
advanced less systematically and explicitly than has the
participation-transparency prescription, but it is embodied in
conventional wisdom about constitution making. It is often said
offhandedly that a constitution should be a negotiated document.82
It should be noted that, as most negotiations take place in private,
there is some tension between transparency and negotiation as
modalities of constitutional choice. Negotiation is an inevitable part
of constitutional design, but the extent of negotiation is and ought
to be variable.
In post-conflict constitution making, and particularly in post-
violence constitution making, a heavy role will be reserved for
negotiation by virtue of the force possessed by both sides. If a
“mutually hurting stalemate”83 forms the background to the
constitutional process, then the ability of each side to inflict damage
on the other implies that a bargain between the two sides—or,
occasionally, more than two sides—will be necessary.
There are other circumstances in which a heavily negotiated
outcome is required. Where violent conflict has not taken place, but
where constitution making is necessary, there may be great
polarization in the polity. In these circumstances, if the formal
requirements for constitutional change—either the requirements
for amendments or for referenda—are stringent, as they may well
be, then negotiation will be the only way a constitutional process
can move forward. Taiwan is an example of this. There has been no
appreciable violent conflict on Taiwan since 1947, but politics on the
island is strongly polarized between the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green
camps, and the Taiwan amendment and referendum processes are
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unusually arduous.84 Every amendment has required a bargain
between camps,85 a point this Article will return to later.86
All constitutional processes involve negotiation, especially those
in which the parties involved in the process have great visibility—or
think they do—concerning their future interests. Nevertheless, it
should not be thought that every constitutional process involves
only negotiation. The American process of 1787, for instance,
involved negotiation, exemplified best by the Great Compromise
that, by according each state equal representation in the Senate,
saved the Constitutional Convention from collapse.87 The presi-
dency, however, was created by a different process.
The Convention was divided between, on one side, those who
feared that a single executive might recreate a monarchy and who
believed the elected legislature would be the guardian of liberty
and, on the other side, those who feared the popular branch or, for
other reasons, saw the need for a strong executive.88 Under the
Articles of Confederation, most states had weak governors who had
succeeded the colonial governors, and so most plans proposed an
executive chosen by and accountable to the legislature—in some
cases, a plural executive rather than a single executive, but in any
case a weak and dependent one.89 In the end, the matter was
resolved in two committees influenced heavily by a few delegates
experienced in two states with directly elected governors, one of
which—New York’s—had broad powers.90 James Wilson and
Gouverneur Morris worked in two committees to shape a presidency
modeled, except with respect to direct election, on the powers of the
governor of New York.91
And so the American separation of powers was manifestly not a
product of bargaining, but of planning based on comparison of
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various models of executives and their relation to the legislature.
That is not to say that this particular act of planning was entirely
legitimate, for many delegates were either skeptical of or opposed
to the type of presidency created by Morris and Wilson late in the
proceedings and presented almost as a fait accompli.92 Neverthe-
less, it was an act that drew on expertise and comparative knowl-
edge in the pursuit of a goal made manifest by the failure of the
previous regime to produce a vigorous executive.93 Say what one
will about the separation of powers, there is no doubt that the
equilibrium point of a negotiated outcome would have been quite
different from the outcome that emerged.
In constitution making, there may be a tradeoff between
negotiation and coherence. Bargained outcomes have much to
commend them—everyone gets something—but the various parts
of bargained outcomes may not fit together. In constitutions that
aim at conflict reduction, the fit of the parts can be a major
problem. After all, some societies need strong, coherent, even
redundant institutions to deal with their problems. Severely divided
societies are in this category: they need a strong ensemble of
conflict-reducing mechanisms. A wholly negotiated process,
however, is unlikely to produce these mechanisms. It is more likely
to produce some of this and some of that, as the constitutional
process in Fiji in 1996-97 did.
Fiji is a society severely divided between indigenous Fiji and
Indians, the descendants of migrants from India to the islands more
than a century ago.94 Heavily influenced by the incentives view of
conflict reduction, the Fiji Constitution Review Commission
produced a report recommending adoption of the alternative vote as
a way to produce vote pooling and interethnic coalitions.95 Fiji has
a history of ethnically reserved seats, in which both candidates and
voters are limited to members of particular ethnic groups, rather
than the whole electorate.96 Not all of these seats could be abol-
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ished, so the Commission retained twenty-five of them in a house
of seventy, leaving forty-five open seats for interethnic vote pooling
that would benefit whatever parties engaged in it.97 From the
outset, therefore, there were limits on the likely impact of the
electoral system, recommended because of its tendency to promote
interethnic accommodation.
When the recommendations were reviewed by a parliamentary
committee, these proportions were more than reversed: forty-six
reserved seats and only twenty-five open seats were provided.98
Beyond that, legislators from the Indian minority demanded
guaranteed representation in the cabinet—a consociational feature
—and secured a provision whereby any party gaining at least 10
percent of parliamentary seats would be entitled to a proportionate
share of cabinet offices.99 No ethnic veto, however, was accorded to
Indians, and the British convention of majority confidence was
explicitly retained.100 This was a hybrid constitution, drawing
inspiration from the incentives approach, the consociational
approach, and the majoritarian approach. The parliamentary
committee diluted the more consistent approach of the Constitution
Review Commission. In addition to reducing the number of seats
available for interethnic vote pooling, it opened the possibility of
planting extremists, with only 10 percent of legislative seats, in a
cabinet intended to be the product of interethnic vote pooling and
dedicated to moderation and compromise on ethnic issues.101 Rather
than redundant, consistent institutions, the Fijian parliament
produced a mix of institutions that was not completely coherent.
If there is often a tradeoff between negotiation and coherence,
there appears to be one class of partial exceptions. It was said
earlier that a major obstacle to adoption of consociational institu-
tions would be the reluctance of majorities that have 100 percent of
power within their reach to apportion a significant fraction of that
power—in the case of group vetoes, an equal share of it—to
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minorities.102 If the majority is unusually weak or vulnerable,
however, as it was in different ways in Northern Ireland (1998),
Bosnia (1995), and Cyprus (1960),103 it becomes possible for a
minority or minorities to negotiate successfully for a coherent
consociational regime, albeit in the face of great reluctance or
resistance on the part of majorities. This is what was negotiated in
all three of those countries, but when a consociational regime was
proposed again for Cyprus in the Annan Plan of 2004, the Greek-
Cypriot majority was no longer in a weak position, and the proposal
was rejected in a referendum.104
One of the circumstances that can produce sufficient weakness
to induce acceptance of a consociational constitution is the existence
of protracted civil war. When the time comes to settle such conflicts,
minority groups that have been engaged in secessionist warfare or
other forms of resistance to the central government will be inclined
to demand guarantees in exchange for laying down arms. If the
warfare had secessionist aims, the likely formula will include
extensive territorial autonomy in the areas secessionists already
control or in the areas they claim as the traditional lands inhabited
by members of their group.105 These claims often have a large
element of historical fiction about them—for groups are far more
mobile than territorial claimants usually admit—and the territory
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claimed is not generally ethnically homogeneous, containing as it
usually does various regional minorities that are vulnerable to at
least as much repression at the regional level as the national
minority is at the central government level.106 These facts ought to
induce caution as settlements are structured; often they have
stymied settlement altogether, as in Sri Lanka, where Tamils claim
land partially inhabited by Sinhalese and Muslims in addition to
Tamils.107 Despite these facts, there is no doubt that a key claim in
settlement negotiations to end secessionist warfare will be that the
rebels or regional politicians who succeed them control the putative
secessionist region and be allowed to rule it autonomously.
At the same time, secessionists who are to be induced to abandon
their claims for independence will demand, or will be offered, a
guaranteed role in the central government, typically with guaran-
teed political offices, guaranteed participation in the armed forces,
guaranteed cabinet offices, and a fixed proportion of budgetary
allocations. In this respect, the terms secessionists demand do not
differ much from terms demanded by those who have participated
in or been victims of civil violence of a non-secessionist sort.
These terms resemble the outlines of a consociational solution,
although there are assuredly some deviations. The electoral system
may not be proportional, the governmental system may be presiden-
tial, the positions in cabinet may be fixed in advance by party or by
group representation rather than deriving from election results,
and minority-group vetoes are unlikely to be conceded.
After protracted warfare, there will almost surely be interna-
tional involvement in the negotiation process, whether the external
actors represent states that have offered good offices, international
regional organizations such as the African Union, or broader
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international bodies. These third parties will encourage negotia-
tions and may mediate or facilitate discussions.108 Whatever their
precise role, however, it is virtually certain that such external
actors will push the negotiating parties—and usually push them
hard—to achieve a bargained settlement. If the negotiations reach
a successful conclusion, they are likely to entail some package of the
kind described above, with significant consociational features, albeit
falling short of the full prescription favored by consociationalists.
Here, then, is a category of case in which a wholly negotiated
settlement moves significantly toward the consociational end of the
spectrum.
It is true that such settlements are frequently breached—which
is further testimony to their long-term unattractiveness to majori-
ties whose momentary situation induces them to accede to those
settlements—and that warfare frequently returns or, if it does not,
a political stalemate or breakdown frequently results. Some of these
consequences have been observed in African and European cases in
previous sections of this Article.109 Those unfortunate results may
be relevant to the wisdom of particular terms of agreement or to the
advisability of pushing hard against majority preferences when
majorities are momentarily vulnerable. The pertinent point for now
is different: although a bargaining process and coherence of
outcome are usually at odds, the negotiations to end internal wars
may produce a settlement that, because of the nature of minority
demands, tends toward group guarantees that resemble aspects of
the consociational formula. Apart from these cases, negotiation
usually involves an exchange of incommensurables because of
divergent preferences, and hence typically a less than fully coherent
outcome.
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IV. THREE PROBLEMS, THREE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
There are undoubtedly many processes by which a constitution
can be made.110 Close inspection of constitutional processes would
reveal a wide variety of specific combinations and sequences of
practices that could have significant effects on outcomes. Yet it is
worth highlighting, if only in a crude way that approximates a first
cut, three general methods of proceeding that bear on the attain-
ment of particular goals. The key is to fit the process to the
problem.
As mentioned previously, the literature on public participation
and transparency has particular relevance to states in which
distrust of the sitting regime is prevalent.111 Suppose the problem
is simply the public acceptability of the deal that moves an
authoritarian state to a democratic regime. There may be indiffer-
ence among the particular institutions to be chosen. After all, many
countries can live with some standard version of parliamentary or
presidential institutions. In that case, either sitting politicians and
opposition politicians or a separately elected assembly can consum-
mate a deal more or less in the open, with a considerable level of
public input. The draft can, if necessary, be ratified by the public
in a referendum. Under these conditions, criteria of openness,
publicity, and transparency can easily be met. This might be labeled
process model number one, which responds to problem number one,
the problem of distrust of the outgoing regime.
Not all states will meet this description. If the problem is the
difficult one of crafting a set of arrangements that will enable
conflicted ethnic groups to share power in a country that needs not
only democratic government but a heavy dose of institutions for
conflict reduction, something different may be required. For reasons
already discussed, ordinary majoritarianism can lead to ethnic
exclusion,112 and resort to expert advice is called for. This is a
problem faced by many states.
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In this case, an expert body, or expertly informed body, needs to
be commissioned and given time to study and work quietly to devise
a consistent plan that has a fighting chance of producing an
arrangement that will not yield zero-sum results among the ethnic
groups in conflict. Although there needs to be periodic public
consultation, experts also need to be consulted behind closed
doors. There are precedents for organizing such consultations. In
some cases, commissions of inquiry have been appointed to study
and deliberate, with the aid of commission staff and outside
consultants.113 In others, specially elected constitutional assemblies
have been accorded extended periods of time to consult widely and
produce recommendations.114 No doubt there are several other ways
of accomplishing the same thing.
However the task is organized, the goal is to produce a coherent,
consistent plan of mutually reinforcing institutions that will work
to reduce conflict. The development of that plan will entail consulta-
tion with political leaders, who, in the end, will need to confer their
assent. Yet—at least in the absence of violent conflict that requires
resolution urgently, usually on a heavily negotiated basis—it is
remarkable how a carefully conceived structure can provide the
time and space for an appropriate degree of comparative learning
and deliberation. If this is achieved, an expert or expert-influenced
draft will not be, and should not be, the last word, but it can be
accorded a starting advantage in structuring public consideration
of constitutional options. A side benefit is that such a process is also
likely to yield an end product that is far more carefully drafted than
many contemporary constitutions have been.
Leaders in severely divided states often lack basic information
about, and nearly always lack sophisticated analysis of, the full
range of available options for constitutional engineering to reduce
conflict. It is often possible to suggest ways in which their basic
interests and those of their groups can be protected without
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requiring them to pursue extreme strategies that produce or
exacerbate intergroup conflict. There are times when leaders are
open to such ideas, especially when the process has been engineered
in such a way that quiets the crisis atmosphere that so frequently
characterizes the first phase of democratic constitution making
after conflict and creates deliberative space.
It should be obvious that the exigencies of such a process are at
odds with the highest levels of openness and public participation,
especially during some portions of the early stages, but certainly
not with all public participation and transparency, and that the
process needs to be conceived carefully. This might be labeled
process model number two, responding to problem number two, the
problem of intergroup conflict.
There is, however, a subcategory of severely divided societies that
requires a third model. The assumption thus far has been that a
new constitution is required and all parties are open to the idea.
The only question relates to the process by which the new document
should be crafted. But suppose this assumption does not prevail.
Suppose there is a constitution that is inefficient and perhaps also
undemocratic, but that nonetheless has considerable claims to
legitimacy for some significant, defined segment of the population.
If either of the first two processes is followed, there is a risk of
exacerbating the conflict by the very process of constitutional
renovation. There is also a risk of creating a serious challenge to the
legitimacy of any constitution that emerges from the process. If
politicians try to do a deal in the open, they will fail, and fail
conspicuously, while simultaneously proving and reinforcing the
intractability of their differences. Those who represent the segment
attached to the old constitution will not agree to scrap it. If the
second process is followed, either the experts will not agree or, if
they do, the draft will fail when it is sent forward for consideration
by political leaders, because there is no way around the conflict
between the old constitution, with its loyal adherents, and whatever
is to replace it.
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Taiwan has this problem,115 and Indonesia has had it.116 In each
case, a differentiated segment of the population is or was attached
to the old constitution, which, by any objective standard, is or was
ineffective and in need of thorough renovation. Taiwan has not
solved this problem, but Indonesia has.
Taiwan has a dysfunctional version of a five-branch Confucian
Constitution, drafted for the Republic of China, with the various
branches intruding into matters that might have been reserved to
other branches.117 Superimposed on this structure is a French-style
semi-presidential arrangement, but with the prime minister
perched anomalously between the president and the Legislative
Yuan and with the directly elected president exercising much less
effective power than might be expected in a semi-presidential
system.118 Responsibility is diffused in undesirable ways. The
combined Confucian and French features have clearly created
difficulties that demand fundamental restructuring.119
Taiwanese nationalists would like to draft a wholly new constitu-
tion that might be designed explicitly for Taiwan, rather than for all
of China, which the Republic of China regime previously sought to
represent and wished to reclaim.120 Some Taiwanese and most
Mainlanders—those who fled China to Taiwan when the commu-
nists took over the mainland in 1949—oppose independence for
Taiwan and so oppose a constitution that is not designated for the
Republic of China.121 Some aim ultimately at reunification with the
mainland and therefore wish to retain an explicitly Chinese
constitution rather than adopt a Taiwanese constitution.122 Many
others on Taiwan do not believe that either reunification with
China or independence for Taiwan is feasible and so also oppose
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radical changes in the status quo that would be symbolized by a
new constitution for Taiwan alone.123 This middle group forms a
plurality on the island.124
Overlapping some of these divisions are divisions over the
structure of the existing constitution, attachment to which is
greater the closer on the spectrum one moves to the pro-unification
and Mainlander camps.125 The Pan-Blue camp, consisting of the
Kuomintang and its allies, resists fundamental constitutional
change, while the Pan-Green camp, the Democratic People’s Party
and its allies, champions exactly that kind of change.126 The issue
threatens to polarize the island further by eliminating the moderate
middle, a course that would be quite dangerous.
Indonesia confronted an analogous problem after Suharto fell in
1998. The 1945 constitution had been drafted in haste and was
intended to be temporary.127 It embodied a view of state power that
left little room for human rights or the rule of law.128 It seemed to
impart lawmaking power to the president and yet referred to a
supralegislative body, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR),
as possessing “sovereignty.”129 On one reading, the president could
do as he wished, for the text provided that he “hold[s] the power of
government.”130 For decades, Sukarno and Suharto both read it that
way.131 On another reading, the MPR was truly supreme; and, with
Suharto gone, the MPR began autonomously to assert its powers,
including the power to choose and remove the president despite his
fixed term.132
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For all its faults, the 1945 constitution had a considerable base
of support even after democratic reform began in 1998. Indonesian
society is divided into several aliran, meaning currents or
streams.133 A major line of division concerns religion. Secular
nationalists associated with Megawati Sukarnoputri—who won
one-third of the vote and one-third of the legislative seats in 1999,
but had more support when secular nationalists in other parties
and in the army were added—were deeply attached to the old
constitution.134 That constitution was associated with the anti-
colonial struggle;135 it was a product of a time when secular
nationalists were ascendant; it had been reaffirmed by Megawati’s
father, Sukarno, in 1959;136 and it embodied concepts of Pancasila,
the five fundamental truths nationalists wanted the state to live
by.137 Like the ROC constitution in Taiwan, the 1945 Indonesian
Constitution was a bulwark against an emerging threat to the
identity of its proponents—in this case, the threat from Islam, of
which secular nationalists are as wary as Mainlanders and their
allies are of radical Taiwanese nationalism.138 Consequently, many
in the secular-nationalist camp wanted no change in the constitu-
tion or, in any case, as little as possible.
Indonesians in the MPR were afraid of splitting the society, so
they did not adhere to a deadline in changing the constitution.
Instead, Indonesian leaders awaited a consensus on every issue of
constitutional change and took more than four years to produce a
new constitution.139 Or, rather, a new-old constitution, because they
merely amended the 1945 constitution in a way that preserved the
Pancasila preamble and the overall form of the constitution but
changed its substance to: (1) create, for the first time, a directly
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elected president, a separation of powers, and checks and balances;
(2) virtually eliminate the MPR as a supralegislature except for a
few emergency functions; (3) add a constitutional court as an
earnest of the rule of law; and (4) produce de facto federalism in a
nominally unitary state.140 In crafting the directly elected presi-
dency, the Indonesians borrowed a version of the Nigerian system
of election by plurality plus territorial distribution in order to create
an incentive for the president to have a pan-ethnic outlook.141
The politics of this process of constitutional renovation is much
too complex to rehearse here, but what is most interesting is that
the process was led, in significant part, by some modernist Muslims
who did not share most of the apprehensions of secular nationalists
but were eager to avoid dangerous polarization.142 The result was
to eliminate dysfunctional institutions, all the while preserving
consensus and keeping secular nationalists attached to the process
and to the emerging constitution. All of this occurred because the
Indonesians proceeded by systematic and extensive amendment,
rather than by scrapping the 1945 constitution, which richly
deserved scrapping. A side benefit of this gradual process was that
the Indonesians had repeated opportunities to revisit previous
decisions in order to correct what they saw as errors before
interests crystallized around new institutions.
Can Taiwan accomplish a similar renovation by amendment that
will avoid the polarization that a one-shot redrafting would entail?
Taiwan’s amendment process has very high hurdles. In addition to
a supermajority to pass amendments, there is a referendum
provision with steep thresholds for passage.143 This is a major
barrier to proceeding by amendment in the Indonesian way.
For states that have a type-three problem, the stakes are very
high. The constitution is likely to be bound up inextricably with core
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ethnic and other identity issues. Inapt resolution of constitutional
issues can shrink the moderate middle and increase the distance
between the polar extremes. The Indonesian process is worthy of
close study in such cases, because preventing polarization is always
a major, but sometimes neglected, goal of constitutional processes.
V. MATCHING PROCESSES WITH PROBLEMS
Just as there are some times that are more open to constitutional
innovation than others, there are times when choices of process are
more open. Yet there is no escaping the fact that process choices,
like the choice of institutions to be incorporated in a constitution,
are heavily colored by constraint. An example of these constraints
has already been reviewed. After civil or secessionist war, an end to
the fighting or the prevention of its resumption is likely to be
produced by bilateral negotiation that, by its nature, is conducive
to guarantees of a generally consociational sort.144 Similarly, a
sitting authoritarian regime and an opposition that has shaken but
not displaced it generally engage in an exchange of commitments.
In such cases, constitutional planning, with full scrutiny of
available options, is unusual. The structure of each situation
provides the constraint that narrows the options.
It is generally after the violence has definitively ended or the
authoritarians have departed that constitutional planning can
proceed. If interim arrangements have been put in place, political
actors who benefit from them are unlikely to wish to start a wholly
new constitutional process. Interests crystallize quickly in such
settings. Of course, if the initial post-conflict settlement breaks
down, as many do, there will not be a chance to reach the stage of
constitutional planning then either. 
Even if the settlement does not break down, however, and there
is receptivity to creating new institutions, there is no equivalent of
a traffic police officer to direct particular problems to the process
most appropriate for them. It is possible to enumerate processes
that might prove best for dealing with an instance of one or another
type of problem, but the determinants of the choice of one or
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another process are, at this stage, truly uncertain. The parties in
conflict may be exhorted to proceed in public, or to deploy expertise
in a highly deliberative process, or to proceed by gradual amend-
ment and consensus to prevent alienation and polarization, but
these are, in the end, just exhortations. The parties may proceed by
whatever method seems expedient and consistent with their
interests.
There is, therefore, the prior question of who sets the procedural
agenda and what can motivate an agenda-setting process that sorts
problems reliably. As of now, this issue of the metaprocess—the
process that leads to the process—has no convincing answers. This
is yet another reason why, since 1989, there has been much
constitution making but much less conflict reduction or prevention
of its recurrence.
